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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATF (II"" UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020738-CA
v.
JEFFREY A. HEIL,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

I H N I M Ill I III'"! I N "i .MM PI \ IHItl> OF P R O C E E D I N G S
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF RE V IE\ \ •
I.

Does the invited error doctrine preclude defendant's claim that the
trial court plainly erred in admitting Dr. Delcore's letter where defense
counsel strategically stipulated to its admission?
No standard of review applies to this claim.

II.

Do defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail where counsel
reasonably relied on defendant's inaccurate description of Dr.
Delcore's testimony in waiting until near trial to contact the doctor,
and admission of Dr. Delcore's letter was less harmful to defendant
than live testimony would have been?
An ineffective assistance claim preserved below "presents . . . a mixed question of

law and fact." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App. 1997). This Court

"defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact, but review[s] its legal conclusions for
correctness." Id.
III.

Does defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fail where the
prosecutor revealed the source of Dr. Delcore's letter before it was
admitted?
"'Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact

on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's [ruling] on prosecutorial
misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d
1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998)). "'This standard is met
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.'" Id.
(quoting Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276) (internal quotation marks and additional citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are necessary to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 10, 2001, defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second
degree felony. R. 1-2. After a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. R.
87-88. Defendant's sentence of one-to-fifteen years in prison and his $10,000 fine were
suspended, and defendant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail and thirty-six months
probation. R. 157-59, 162-66.
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Defendant moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. R. 170-82. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's
motion. R. 253-61.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 282.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Only Fred Orton and defendant really know what transpired between them on
August 25, 2002. R. 314:57. However, Orton's severe injuries make up for the
deficiency in witnesses.
A History of Conflict
Fred Orton and defendant had a history of conflicts, centering around Orton's
cows trespassing on defendant's hay field. R. 314:39, 93, 230. Defendant had a
judgement against Orton for livestock trespass and often threatened Orton when he found
Orton's cattle on his property. R. 314:291. Defendant would also run along his fence
while Orton was herding his cattle up and down the adjacent county road, telling Orton he
would "kick [his] ass" and warning Orton that "those damned livestock better not get on
[my] place." R. 314:284. During one of those confrontations, defendant told Orton that
he was a professional boxer and that he'd beat Orton to death. R. 314:38, 238.

1

Except as otherwise indicated, the facts of the crime are recited in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 2, 6 P.3d 1116.
3

"I told you Vd kill you, you son-of-a-bitch your cows got in my hay

again,...

I'll beat you to death."
On August 25, 2002, Orton learned from a neighbor that some of Orton's cows
were coming in off the open range toward his fields that bordered defendant's property.
R. 314:29. Orton drove north along the county road next to defendant's property and
rounded up his cattle. Id. When Orton arrived at defendant's gate along the road, his
cows were on the road "stringing" toward his own property. R. 314:29, 38. Orton
stopped to shut defendant's gate so that his cattle would not enter defendant's land. R.
314:30. As he was tending to one side of the gate, Orton heard a Jeep pull up behind him.
R. 314:31-32.
Before Orton turned around to see who was in the Jeep, defendant "football
tackled [him] from behind." Id. Defendant then grabbed Orton's hair and collar. Id.
Orton looked to see who had attacked him, but all he could see were the ends of
someone's fingers and a rock, which hit him in the eye so he couldn't see. Id. Defendant
then got on top of Orton and punched Orton some seven times with his right fist. R.
314:75, 82, 236. Before he went unconscious, Orton felt his jaw break. R. 314:32.
When Orton awoke, defendant was kicking him in the ribs and head. Id. As Orton
crawled toward his truck, defendant kicked him one more time "for all the cows he's
starved." R. 314:33, 243. When Orton got into his truck, defendant was still standing in
the gateway, screaming "I told you I'd kill you, you son-of-a-bitch your cows got in my
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hay again,.. . I'll beat you to death." R. 314:33. Defendant was "in a rage" and threw
Orton's sunglasses and hat at him. R. 314:34.
The attack took place about five or six feet from defendant's gate on his property.
R. 314:77.
Orton's Injuries
Orton's injuries were extensive. R. 314:67. Orton had significant bruising on his
face, and his jaw was fractured on both sides. R. 314:70-71, 177. Orton's right eye was
severely swollen, and he had bruising on his upper chest. R.314:184.
The fracture to Orton's left side of his jaw was not treatable; it had to heal on its
own. R. 314:178. Orton had surgery to repair the right side of his jaw. R. 314:178, 36.
He then required dentures because his teeth fit together differently after the attack. R.
314:178.
Dr. Pearson, who treated Orton after the incident, confirmed that most of Orton's
injuries were consistent with being struck on the face with a fist. R. 314:186, 190, 19495. The jaw fractures, however, were more consistent with a blow from a small object
which allowed the force to be concentrated or from a very powerful punch. R. 314:186,
190, 194-95.
After the attack, Orton needed assistance running his farm for quite some time. R.
314:36. Orton could not ride a horse and had severe headaches for several months. R.
314:35-36. According to his doctor, Orton likely will never regain full jaw mobility, and
he may still get headaches from the pain in his jaw. R. 314:179.
5

Defendant had some minor bruising on his left shoulder. R. 314:132. He also had
bruises on his knuckles as well as a scaphoid fracture in his right hand, most likely caused
by defendant's hitting Orton with his fist. R. 314:95, 238, 303.
Orton was not defendant's only victim
William Larson used to be one of defendant's neighbors. Once, when his cows got
onto defendant's property, defendant started screaming at him and threatened to "beat the
shit out of him." R.314:265-66. After defendant's wife warned Larson not to get out of
his car, defendant attacked Larson's car, hitting the window several times and kicking the
vehicle. Id. According to Larson, he did nothing to provoke defendant, but merely came
to retrieve his cows. Id. Larson concluded, "I was so afraid that I quit raising any kind of
animals on that properly. I just backed off and got away from there." R. 314:267.
Dennis Gaede used to work for defendant as a truck driver. R. 314:270. When
Gaede told defendant he was quitting, defendant threatened to "kick [his] butt." Id.
Gaede remembered that defendant had similarly lost his temper in other situations "at the
drop of a hat." R. 314:272, 274. According to Gaede, defendant bragged about fights he
had won in California and about his hands being weapons. R. 314:273-74. Gaede's wife
recalled that defendant admitted he was hot-headed, that he had been in some fights, and
that his "hands were registered weapons." R. 314:280-81
Detective Drishinski, the investigating officer, testified that defendant is a boxer
and "could do serious damage with his hands." R.314:75.
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Defendantfs story
Defendant admitted that he had training in boxing and martial arts. R.314:240.
He testified, however, that he has never threatened or fought anyone else in Iron County.
R. 314:257. He is "a lover, not a fighter." R. 314:241.
Defendant testified that he had already shooed Orton's cattle off his land when he
met Orton that day. R. 314:229. He then saw Orton's cattle approaching one of his gates.
R. 314:230. Defendant decided to close the gate to keep Orton's cows off his property.
R. 314:231.
Defendant was in the process of closing the gate when Orton arrived. R. 314:231,
233. When Orton stopped, defendant confronted him concerning his cows. R. 314:233.
Defendant told Orton "that [he] had absolutely had it" and that he was going to report
Orton to the authorities. Id. "I was tired of him starving his animals and I was going to
put a stop to it. I said, when I'm done with you you'll never be able to starve another
animal again, I've had it. And I said, I'm going to solve this problem once and for all."
Id
Defendant claimed, however, that he did not threaten Orton physically in any way.
Id. Rather, Orton got out of his truck and came at defendant with a 12-inch crescent
wrench, saying "if you want to solve this problem, let's solve it right now." R. 314:93,
233-34.
Defendant claimed he parried the wrench and then hit Orton only in self-defense
and only until Orton stopped "coming at me." R. 314:235, 237-41, 246-48, 257.
7

Defendant admitted, however, that he did kick Orton "in the butt [as Orton was returning
to his truck]... for all the cows he's starved." R. 314:243. Defendant explained,
"[0]nce I kicked him in the butt,... I allowed him to grab his hat and his crescent
wrench, and I allowed him to get back to his truck." R. 314:256.
The day after the attack, defendant learned that he had a scaphoid fracture in his
right hand. R. 314:238. He was treated by Dr. Delcore, who put a cast on his arm and
was "insistent" that defendant take work off until the fracture healed. R. 314:242.
At trial, defendant called Scott Holyoke, who testified that he and Orton had had
confrontations before concerning Orton's livestock. R. 314:210. During one of those
confrontations, the two got into a fight. R. 314:211. Orton threw the first punch. R.
314:212.
Kenny Rossberg, a former friend of Orton's, recalled once on a trip when Orton
got mad at Rossberg's horse and got a gun to shoot it. R. 314:219-21. Rossberg was
surprised by how quickly Orton got mad. R. 314:220-21.
Finally, defendant testified that William Larson was "inaccurate" when he testified
that defendant had threatened him. R. 314:291. In addition, defendant had a judgment
against him for livestock trespass. Id, Defendant described Dennis Gaede as a reckless
employee who blew up three motors while working for him. R. 314:292. Moreover,
Gaede told defendant he was quitting on a Friday and wouldn't be driving anymore, even
though defendant needed him the following Monday. R. 314:293.
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Dr. Delcore's Testimony
Dr. Delcore treated defendant's scaphoid fracture after the attack. R. 314:173,
239, 242, 303. In his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that "Mr. Heil
defended himself and as a result his wrist was fractured. And his doctor will testify about
that fracture and tell you what he thinks caused it." R. 314:27.
However, although subpoenaed by defendant, Dr. Delcore called the trial court
after the first day of trial to explain that he had been served with a subpoena the day
before but was not able to testify at defendant's trial because of scheduled surgeries. R.
314:172-73 (attached at Addendum A). He then summarized for the court what his
testimony would have been had he been able to appear. Id. He stated he would testify
that defendant's scaphoid fracture was caused by the wrist being bent backwards. Id.
Although a scaphoid fracture could be caused by being hit by something, it was much
more likely caused by either falling down or throwing a punch. Id.
The trial court wrote down the doctor's proffer and then told him to go to the
surgeries, that he would be contacted between surgeries to verify that the court's summary
of his testimony was accurate. R. 314:173.
When the court disclosed this contact to counsel the next morning, defense counsel
indicated he had served the subpoena on the doctor on Tuesday for a Friday appearance.
R. 314:173. Counsel explained that the late notice was because, before then, he was not
sure who defendant's witnesses were going to be. Id. Counsel further explained that
defendant had talked with Dr. Delcore before trial. R. 314:173-74. In addition, counsel
9

"made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore myself," including leaving a phone message for him
with "my home phone number and my office phone number." Id.
The court noted, "I don't know if you even[] want him. I mean, if that's what his
testimony is going to be it's more helpful to the prosecution than to the defense." R.
314:174. Defense counsel asked for an opportunity to discuss the matter with the
prosecutor. Id.
During a subsequent break in testimony, the court contacted Dr. Delcore in
chambers to verify its account of his testimony. R. 314:295-303 (attached at Addendum
B). Both the prosecutor and defense counsel were present during the call and were
allowed to ask the doctor questions. R. 314:295-300. Dr. Delcore again stated that
defendant's injury was most likely caused by "a fall on an outstretched hand or . ..
jerking the wrist back forcibly" and that it "is extremely unlikely if not almost impossible
to . . . fracture a scaphoid with a concussion or a contusion mechanism injury."
R.314:296. Thus, although defendant suggested "he may have sustained the injury from
being struck . . . by a . . . monkey wrench," the likelihood of a wrench hitting the wrist
and causing this kind of fracture was extremely low. R. 314:296-297. Moreover, if a
wrench caused the injury, one would expect to see a contusion or laceration on the wrist.
R. 314:299-300. None was seen here. Id.
After questioning, counsel and the court went off the record. R. 314:300. When
the record resumed, the court asked, "[h]ow do you want to address what we just
resolved? One of you read it, just publish it, have the clerk read it, or what?" R. 314:300.
10

The State suggested that the clerk read the statement and then provide it to the jury during
deliberations. R.314:300-301. Defense counsel said, "[t]hat's fine." R. 314:301.
When proceedings continued, the trial court explained that Dr. Delcore's
"testimony is going to be submitted by agreement of both sides by way of a letter." R.
314:302. The court continued, "The two attorneys and I have met by speaker phone with
Dr. Delcore just briefly a few minutes ago, and based on his conversation the agreement
was reached to read this letter of his. It is not signed. You'll be given a copy of it. But
it's . . . his position." R.314:302-303.
The clerk then read the following statement into the record:
My name is Randy G. Delcore. I am an orthopaedic surgeon and on
or about August 26, 2001,1 treated Jeffrey Heil for an injury to his
right scaphoid (wrist/hand region of the body).
Mr. Heil reported to me that he received this injury by being struck
with a wrench by another person. While this scenario is possible (I
suppose in this life anything is possible) in my opinion the injury is
consistent with Mr. Heil striking another person with his right hand,
causing the wrist (hand) to rotate backward and thus causing the
injury . . . . not blunt force trauma from a wrench or other instrument.
And that there was no laceration or bruising on the wrist.
I apologize that I cannot be present in Court today, but I did not
receive a Subpoena until Wednesday, May 1, 2002, therein
requesting my appearance on Friday, May 3, 2002. On this date,
Friday, May 3, 2002,1 am performing seven (7) surgeries beginning
at 6:30 A.M., and I do not anticipate completing my work until 4:00
P.M. or 4:30 P.M. at the earliest.
R.314:303; Exh. 18 (emphasis indicates sentence hand-written by court).
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After the letter was read, the prosecutor moved that the letter be admitted as
evidence. R. 314:304. The trial court stated, "And that's received by stipulation." Id.
Defense counsel did not object. Id.
In closing argument, the prosecutor noted that defendant had testified "in his own
statement that Mr. Orton came at him with a wrench and he used his wrist to swipe away
the wrench and, and that's what caused the break." R. 314:324. The prosecutor then
noted, "Well, if that's true he would have sustained a broken wrist before the fight even
got started. How would he have then been able to cause the kind of force or pressure that
. . . it would have taken to break [Orton's jaw] bone with a broken hand?" R. 314:324.
The prosecutor also stated:
You will have a chance to read Dr. Delcore's letter. And Dr.
Delcore's letter, and it was read to you, but it essentially states that,
that he had the chance to observe the defendant, that he did not
observe any laceration or bruise on the, on the right wrist where the
apparent injury was sustained.
Now I ask you if, if his wrist had been hit by a wrench with
enough force to break his wrist, would there not have been some
kind of bruise or a laceration or some indication of an injury? I think
that there probably would have been . . . .
R. 314:326-27. Finally, the prosecutor argued:
Dr. Delcore goes on to say that this type of injury is consistent
with somebody who has punched somebody and, and causes the
hand to go back like that. That's what this type of injury is
consistent with. And you'll have a chance to, to look over his letter
and, and read that. But it's not consistent with getting hit on top of
the wrist by a wrench.
R. 314:327.
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In his closing argument, defense counsel noted:
At the beginning of this trial[,] . . . I said that I was confident
that the evidence would show that Mr. Orton's cattle were
trespassing. That Mr. Orton himself was trespassing. That he was
not trespassing in a friendly neighborly way, but that he in fact was
trespassing in a threatening and menacing way, that he broke Mr.
Heil's wrist with a cres[c]ent wrench, and that Mr. Heil fought back
in self-defense.
R. 314:335-36. Counsel then reviewed the differences between defendant's testimony
and Orton's testimony. R. 314:336-42. He then noted that the photographs of defendant
would show that defendant did suffer bruising on his left shoulder. R. 314:342. In
addition, "You'll see the cast on his right wrist. Something happened, somehow that
wrist got broken. And yet Mr. Orton testifies that he never struck Mr. Heil." R. 314:342.
Then counsel argued:
Mr. Heil was in immediate danger. Here's a man with a
crescent wrench, could have hit him in the head. He had a right to
defend himself and he didn't have an obligation to run away. And he
testified that he didn't intentionally try to hurt or cause serious bodily
injury to Mr. Orton.
R. 314:347.
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault. R. 314:357.
Defendant's Motion for New Trial
After his conviction, defendant filed a motion for new trial. R. 167-82. Defendant
claimed prosecutorial misconduct for the State's failure to disclose that Scott Burns,
former county attorney and close friend to Dr. Delcore, was the actual author of Dr.
Delcore's letter. R. 167-82. Alternatively, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel
13

for trial counsel's failure to secure Dr. Delcore's presence at trial and his failure to object
to the letter's admission. R. 167-82. After hearing argument, the trial court denied
defendant's motion. R. 314:429 (transcript attached at Addendum C).
Concerning defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim, the court found that the
prosecutor had disclosed the origin of Dr. Delcore's letter to both the court and defense
counsel prior to its admission. R. 258-60 (Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New
Trial, attached at Addendum D). Moreover,
the significant point is whether that proffered testimony is stipulated
to and both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to
the jury. It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as long as
the words have been agreed to by both sides. And they were in this
case.
R. 314:429; R. 258-59.
Concerning defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court noted
that counsel "did the best he could with the facts that he had and the case that was
presented to him by the defendant. My reading of [defense counsel] was that he was
surprised by Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the defendant had
led him to believe." R. 314:429. The court also noted that, although the doctor's
testimony helped the prosecution's case more than it did the defendant's, "what was given
to the jury in written form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr.
Delcore had actually testified. R. 314:430; R. 255.
The court concluded that because defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's
alleged deficient performance, it did not have to decide whether in fact counsel performed
14

deficiently. R. 254-56. The court noted, however, that if counsel had subpoenaed the
doctor "a week or two earlier and Dr. Delcore had been here I think there's, that just
increases the chances of conviction because of the reasons I've just stated. It was more
of, his testimony was more beneficial to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 314:430.
Defendant did not call any witnesses to testify at the motion hearing. R, 314:396431.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in admitting
Dr. Delcore's letter. However, defense counsel specifically stipulated to the letter's
admission at trial, and thus invited any error on the trial court's part.
Issue II. Alternatively, defendant claims that his trial counsel performed
deficiently, first, in failing to adequately investigate the doctor's testimony, and, second,
in not objecting to admission of the doctor's letter. However, defense counsel's approach
to Dr. Delcore was based on his understanding from defendant that the doctor's testimony
would be favorable. Under those circumstances, counsel had no pressing need to contact
the doctor early, and did not perform deficiently in waiting instead until just prior to trial.
Furthermore, once counsel became aware that Dr. Delcore's testimony would not be as
helpful as defendant had apparently indicated, counsel reasonably chose to minimize that
testimony by stipulating to admission of the doctor's letter rather than requiring the doctor
to testify in person. Finally, as the trial court itself noted, even if counsel did perform
deficiently vis-a-vis the doctor, defendant was not prejudiced by that performance
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because Dr. Delcore's live testimony would have been more damaging for defendant than
was the doctor's letter.
Issue III. Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct by presenting Dr. Delcore's letter without disclosing that the letter was
actually written by the county prosecutor, who was a close friend of the doctor's.
Because the trial court specifically found at defendant's motion for a new trial that the
prosecutor had disclosed the origin of the doctor's letter prior to its admission,
defendant's claim fails.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE PRECLUDES DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN
ADMITTING DR. DELCORE'S LETTER WHERE DEFENSE
COUNSEL STRATEGICALLY STIPULATED TO ITS ADMISSION
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's carte blanche acceptance of Dr. Delcore's

unsigned statement into evidence" was plain error. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Specifically,
defendant argues that "the trial court plainly erred in allowing Dr. Delcore's statement to
be admitted into evidence" because the statement was obviously inadmissible hearsay and
because its admission obviously violated his right to confrontation. Aplt. Br. at 13, 19,
24-26. This Court should not reach defendant's claim where his trial counsel led the
court into any error by strategically stipulating to the evidence.
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To establish plain error, defendant must show that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
However, this Court "will decline to consider a defendant's plain-error arguments
if the alleged errors reasonably resulted from defense counsel's 'conscious decision to
refrain from objecting,' or if defense counsel 'led the trial court into error.'" State v. Hall,
946 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59
(Utah 1989)); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State v. Anderson,
929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). Thus, this Court will not consider a plain error claim
"if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she
had no objection . . . ." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 54, 70 P.3d 111.
Here, when the trial court asked how counsel wanted to address Dr. Delcore's
letter, and the prosecutor suggested that the clerk read it to the jury, defense counsel said
"That's fine, your Honor." R. 314:301. In addition, defense counsel raised no objection
when the trial court stated—several times in open court—that counsel had stipulated to
the admission of Dr. Delcore's letter. R. 314:302 ("testimony is going to be submitted by
agreement of both sides by way of a letter); R. 314:302-03 ("the agreement was reached
to read this letter"); R. 314:304 ("And [the letter is] received by stipulation."); See also R.
258-59, R. 314:429. Thus, defense counsel led the trial court into any error in admitting
the letter.
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Moreover, defense counsel had a sound strategic reason for his decision. Counsel
had already told the jury that defendant's doctor would be testifying. R. 314:27. Not
calling the doctor could cause a loss of credibility with the jury. However, much to
counsel's surprise, Dr. Delcore's testimony was not as defendant had represented. See R.
314:429 (court noting at hearing on motion for new trial that counsel "was surprised by
Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the defendant had led him to
believe."). In fact, as the trial court noted, the testimony was "going to be . . . more
helpful to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 314:174.
In light of this turn of events, defense counsel had to decide which would hurt
defendant's case less—the doctor appearing in person to give testimony favorable to the
State or a letter briefly summarizing his testimony.2 Counsel apparently decided the
latter. See R. 314:301. As the trial court noted during hearing on defendant's motion for
new trial, that decision was sound. See R. 314:430 (court noting that "what was given to
the jury in written form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr.
Delcore had actually testified).
Because defense counsel not only "consciously elect[ed] [not to object] as part of a
defense strategy," but in fact "led the trial court into error" by stipulating to the letter's
2

Neither below nor on appeal has defendant claimed that admission of Dr.
Delcore's testimony violated his physician-patient privilege. See State v. Kruger, 2000
UT 60, <|j 21, 6 P.3d 1116 (noting reply brief "'limited to answering any new matter set
forth in the opposing brief,'" and where "State did not raise the issue in its brief, but only
pointed out in a footnote that Kruger had not raised the issue in the trial court or in his
opening brief on appeal," "[t]hat observation . . . did not constitute a 'new matter'
entitling Kruger to brief the issue in his reply brief).
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admission, this court should not reach defendant's plain error claim. Bullock, 791 P.2d at
158-59; see also Brown, 948 P.2d at 343; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109; Hall, 946 P.2d at
716.
II.

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS FAIL
WHERE COUNSEL REASONABLY RELIED ON DEFENDANT'S
INACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF DR. DELCORE'S TESTIMONY
IN WAITING UNTIL NEAR TRIAL TO CONTACT THE DOCTOR,
AND ADMISSION OF DR. DELCORE'S LETTER WAS LESS
HARMFUL TO DEFENDANT THAN LIVE TESTIMONY WOULD
HAVE BEEN
Defendant claims that "defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance . . . (1) by

failing to investigate Dr. Delcore's testimony prior to trial; and (2) by failing to timely
object to the admission of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement at trial." Aplt. Br. at 32.
Defendant's claims lack merit.
"To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show,
first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance that fell below an objective standard
of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced defendant." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)).
In considering whether counsel performed deficiently, there is "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Villarreal,
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857 P.2d at 954 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19, 12 P.3d 92. Because counsel is given "wide latitude in
making tactical decisions," courts "will not question such decisions unless there is no
reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)
(quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added); see also
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 6, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. "[T]his [C]ourt will not secondguess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices might
appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) (citations
omitted).
In addition, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. "Attorney errors come in an infinite variety
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial."
Id. at 693. Thus, in addition to showing counsel's deficient performance, defendant must
also demonstrate that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
"It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on
the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, defendant must
show that, absent counsel's acts or omissions, a more favorable result is a "demonstrable

20

reality and not a speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)
(quotations and citations omitted).
A.

Defense counsel's reliance on defendant's representations of how
his doctor would testify does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.

Defendant claims that trial counsel performed deficiently because he "failed to
contact Dr. Delcore or investigate the substance of his testimony prior to trial." Aplt. Br.
at 35. Defendant contends that "[h]ad defense counsel timely contacted and interviewed
Dr. Delcore . . . ? the record fact that Dr. Delcore was involved with the prosecution
would have been evident" and "even if the prosecution had placed Dr. Delcore on the
witnesses [sic] stand at trial, his bias would have been easily made clear to the jury." Id.
at 36. Instead, "where defense counsel's one feeble attempt to telephone Dr. Delcore
[prior to trial] constituted inadequate investigation, deficient performance is established."
Id. at 35. Because defendant's claim is essentially that his counsel was ineffective for
believing his representation of the doctor's testimony, defendant's claim must fail.
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words,
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see also Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 ("If counsel does not
adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability of
prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the 'wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.5") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Consequently, although the "decision not to investigate [at all] cannot be considered a
tactical decision," Templin, 805 P.2d at 188, whether "less than complete investigation" is
reasonable depends on whether information known to counsel "makes particular
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Moreover, "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691. Indeed, "[c]ounsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed
strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant."
Id. "In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such
information." Id. Therefore, "inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant
may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions." Id.
Finally, the fact that counsel waits to contact witnesses until just before trial "in
and of itself raises no inference of deficient performance." Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d
277, 285 (Utah 1995) (rejecting claim that counsel performed deficiently in "wait[ing]
until after the guilt phase to begin preparing for the penalty phase" in death penalty case).
Our courts have "decline[d] to determine what amount of time counsel must spend . . . to
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ensure that the representation does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Clearly, the time period will vary with every case." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526
(Utah 1994). Thus, "each situation must be judged upon its own circumstances and in
light of its own degree of complexity." Jividen v. State, 569 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Ga. App.
2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, defendant bases his claim on the following facts: Defendant was treated by
Dr. Delcore on August 26, 2001, see Aplt. Br. at 33 (citing R. 314:303); trial counsel
appeared in the case two weeks later, see id. (citing R. 3-5); trial counsel was aware of
Dr. Delcore as a potential witness, see Aplt. Br. at 33-34 (citing R. 314:173); counsel
nonetheless did not serve the doctor with a subpoena until April 30, 2002, three days
before trial, see Aplt. Br. at 34 (citing R. 314:73); Dr. Delcore "[apparently . . . did not
receive the subpoena until the day before trial," or two days before he was supposed to
testify, id. (citing R. 314:172-73); and "the only effort specified [on the record concerning
counsel's attempt to contact the doctor] was a telephone message left for Dr. Delcore just
prior to trial," id. at 34 (citing R. 314:173-74).
These facts, when viewed in light of the record as a whole, are inadequate to
support defendant's claim. First, although defense counsel indicated at trial that he
"made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore," R. 314:173, the record is silent as to when or how
often counsel made those efforts. Defendant contends counsel's reference reflects only
"one feeble attempt to telephone Dr. Delcore." Aplt. Br. at 35. However, nothing in the
record mandates that conclusion. Indeed, because counsel's statement that he "made
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efforts" is ambiguous as to when and how often counsel attempted to contact the doctor,
that ambiguity must be "construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17; see also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,
t65,57P.3dll39.3
Second, even if counsel did wait until just before trial to contact the doctor, that
fact alone does not establish deficient performance. Cf. Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285; Parsons,
871 P.2d at 526. Rather, this Court must consider whether counsel's decision was
reasonable under the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (noting that
"strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation"
and that "inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a
proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions").
The record concerning what defense counsel knew about Dr. Delcore's potential
testimony before trial establishes that counsel acted reasonably under the circumstances.
3

"[W]here, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective . . ., defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, 12 P.3d 92. "The necessary consequence of this burden is
that an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. at If 17. "Where
the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Id. ; see also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^ 65, 57 P.3d 1139. Here,
defendant could have developed a record either at the hearing on his motion for new trial
or through a successful motion for a rule 23B remand. Instead, defendant presented no
evidence at the hearing on his motion for new trial, see R. 314:396-432, and alleged
insufficient facts in his motion for a rule 23B remand, see Court of Appeals Order dated
Nov. 17,2003.
24

The record indicates that defendant talked to Dr. Delcore before trial. R. 314:173-74.
Although defense counsel "made efforts" to contact the doctor before trial himself, his
efforts were unsuccessful. R. 314:173-74. Nonetheless, defense counsel referenced Dr.
Delcore's testimony in his opening statement. R. 314:27. Because the presumption of
effective assistance requires that all record ambiguities and gaps be construed against
defendant's claim, see Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, this Court must presume that
defendant told his counsel that the doctor's testimony would be as defense counsel
represented it to the jury in opening. This presumption, which defendant has not rebutted,
is consistent with the trial court's comment at the hearing on defendant's motion for new
trial that defense counsel was apparently misled by defendant concerning the nature of the
doctor's testimony. R. 314:429.4
Because counsel presumably believed defendant's representation that the doctor's
testimony would be entirely helpful to defendant, counsel had no reason to anticipate the
need for impeachment evidence. Thus, counsel had no pressing need to contact the
doctor earlier than he did. See Aplt. Br. at 36 (suggesting that early contact of doctor
would have revealed "that Dr. Delcore was involved with the prosecution" and would
have provided counsel with information through which the doctor's "bias would have
been easily made clear to the jury"). "It is not defense counsel's fault that defendant lied
to him." People v. Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120, 135 (Ct. App., Sixth Dist. 2003).

4

See footnote 2 supra.
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Consequently, counsel's decision not to contact the doctor earlier than he did does
not constitute deficient performance.
B.

Defense counsel's stipulation to Dr. Delcore's letter after
realizing that defendant had misrepresented the doctor's
testimony does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
where the trial court itself noted that the letter would be less
prejudicial to defendant than the doctor's live testimony.

Defendant claims that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the
admission of Dr. Delcore's letter. See Aplt. Br. at 36-38. Defendant claims that "[a]
timely objection" to the evidence as inadmissible hearsay or as violating defendant's
constitutional rights to confrontation "would have precluded Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement from admission into evidence and from being published to the jury." Id. at 37.
"At the very least, a timely objection would have forced the State to request a continuance
to present Dr. Delcore's testimony on a later date, allowing defense counsel time to
prepare effective cross-examination." Id. at 37-38.
As previously discussed, defense counsel had a sound strategic reason for
stipulating to Dr. Delcore's letter. Counsel had already told the jury that defendant's
doctor would be testifying. R. 314:27. Not calling the doctor could cause a loss of
credibility with the jury. However, when, much to his surprise, Dr. Delcore's testimony
was not as defendant represented, see R. 314:429, defense counsel had to decide which
would hurt defendant's case less—the doctor actually appearing to give testimony
favorable to the State and then defendant attempting to undermine that testimony, or a
letter briefly summarizing the doctor's testimony. Counsel's decision in favor of the
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latter was sound. See R. 314:430 (court noting that "what was given to the jury in written
form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr. Delcore had actually
testified).
Thus, defense counsel did not act deficiently in not objecting to Dr. Delcore's
letter.
C.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, defendant cannot
show prejudice where the doctor's testimony was not
inconsistent with his defense

Even if this Court concludes that defense counsel did perform deficiently,
defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudiced.
Defendant claims that counsel's performance prejudiced him because, "[h]ad
defense counsel adequately investigated Dr. Delcore's testimony and properly objected to
the admission of his hearsay statement, defense counsel would have been able to procure
Mr. Heil's constitutional right to confrontation, and expose Dr. Delcore's biases." Aplt.
Br. at 39. In addition, he argues, defendant was prejudiced because, "[d]uring his
opening statement at tr[ia]l, after explaining that Mr. Heil was acting in self defense and
was injured in that effort while being attacked by Mr. Orton, defense counsel informed
the jury that Dr. Delcore .. . would testify about what caused Mr. Heil's injury." Id.
"However, instead of favorable evidence, the jury received Dr. Delcore's damaging
hearsay statement." Id. Finally, defendant urges, he was prejudiced by his counsel's
performance because, "until Dr. Delcore's expert opinion was offered to the jury, the
evidence favored acquittal." Aplt. Br. at 26, 28. Defendant's arguments lack merit.
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To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant "bears
the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have been
convicted absent his counsel's [deficient performance]." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d
439, 441 (Utah 1996). Thus, defendant must "proffer[]. . . record evidence which
undermines [this Court's] confidence in his verdict." Id Defendant has not made that
showing here.
Although defendant claims he would have challenged Dr. Delcore on crossexamination concerning his friendship with then county attorney Scott Burns, see Aplt.
Br. at 36, 39, nowhere does defendant proffer what Dr. Delcore's testimony would have
been in response to that cross-examination. Thus, he "urges this court to assess the
probable impact of testimony without placing before [this Court] the substance of that
testimony." Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441. "This invitation to speculate cannot substitute
for proof of prejudice." Id.
Morover, "[m]aking promises about the defense evidence in opening statement and
then failing to deliver does not constitute ineffective assistance per se." People v.
Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120, 135 (Ct. App., Sixth Dist. 2003). Here, the record shows that
defense counsel tried to contact the doctor before trial but was unsuccessful. R. 314:17374. Having not yet spoken to the doctor, counsel apparently relied on defendant's
summary of what Dr. Delcore's testimony would be to reference that testimony during his
opening statement. R. 314:429. "It is not defense counsel's fault that defendant lied to
him. Nor is it counsel's fault that he told the jury that he would present evidence which,
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apparently during the course of the trial, he discovered was a lie." Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d
at 134.
Counsel could have, as defendant suggests, objected to the letter and thereby
"procurefd] Mr. Heil's constitutional right to confrontation, and expose[d] Dr. Delcore's
biases." Aplt. Br. at 39. However, live testimony is less predictable than written
testimony; in addition, the doctor's conclusions might be subject to greater repetition and
more exacting explanations during live testimony, both of which could have more greatly
undermined defendant's defense. Moreover, to have the doctor appear and then to
strenuously cross-examine him after counsel's opening statement referenced Dr. Delcore
favorably could have substantially undermined the defense's credibility.
In any case, contrary to defendant's claim, see Aplt. Br. at 29, 41, Dr. Delcore's
letter was not inconsistent with defendant's defense. Although defendant intimated that
he might have fractured his wrist in blocking the wrench, he also testified that he really
wasn't sure whether he was ever even hit by the wrench. R. 314:247-48. Furthermore,
defendant admitted to punching Orton several times in self-defense, see R. 314:235, 24041, 257, which was perfectly consistent with the doctor's testimony that a punch is what
caused defendant's fracture. Thus, although the doctor's letter may not have supported
defendant's defense perfectly, it did not, as defendant now claims, "cast[] substantial
doubt on Mr. Heil's self-defense theory of his case" or "gravely undermine[] his
credibility." Aplt. Br. at 29.
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Finally, contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence before Dr. Delcore's letter—
as highlighted by the discrepancy in injuries between defendant and Fred Orton combined
with defendant's own testimony—did not "favor[] acquittal." Aplt. Br. at 26. Orton had
significant bruising on his face, his right eye was severely swollen, he had bruising on his
upper chest, and his jaw was fractured on both sides. R. 314:70-71, 177, 184. Defendant
admitted causing those injuries. R. 314:240, 250, 255, 259. Yet, despite his claim that he
was only defending himself against Orton's attacks, defendant's only injury from Orton
was some minor bruising to his chest/shoulder area. R. 314:98, 132. The lacerations on
his wrist and his broken wrist were apparently caused, not by Orton, but by defendant's
own punches. R. 314:303.5 Lastly, and perhaps most damning, was defendant's
admission that, after he had bruised Orton's eye and broken his jaw in two places,
defendant kicked Orton "in the butt" as Orton struggled to get to his truck. R. 314:96,
247, 256. Then, "once I kicked him in the butt,... I allowed him to grab his hat and his
crescent wrench, and I allowed him to get back to his truck." R. 314:256 (emphasis
added). Such aggressive and merciless conduct—reflecting as it does defendant's
awareness that he was in control of the situation—is not consistent with defendant's claim
that he was acting only in self-defense.
5

Although defendant claims his counsel was ineffective vis-a-vis Dr. Delcore,
defendant does not contend that Dr. Delcore's testimony would never have been admitted
had his counsel objected to Dr. Delcore's letter. Rather, defendant acknowledges that the
State may very well have called the doctor to testify in person. See Aplt. Br. at 36, 39.
Thus, Dr. Delcore's evidence regarding the cause of defendant's broken wrist would have
been before the jury, even if counsel had performed as defendant now says he should
have.
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Defendant's minor contentions do not undermine that conclusion. First, despite
defendant's suggestion otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 27, Fred Orton never seriously disputed
that the attack took place on defendant's property. See R. 314:47-49. Second, although
no rock with blood or hair was found at the scene to corroborate Orton's testimony, see
Aplt. Br. at 27, defendant, who did not even realize he had a broken wrist at the time,
could have easily removed the rock from the area. Third, although a wrench was found
on the front seat of Orton's truck, see Aplt. Br. at 27, two other tools were on top of the
wrench when police observed the truck shortly after the attack, see R. 314:60, implying
that the wrench had not been the last tool used. Finally, although several people testified
that Orton often neglected his cattle and one testified that he and Orton had gotten into a
fight before, see Aplt. Br. at 27, several people also testified for the State concerning
defendant's temper even though defendant himself claimed never to have been in a
confrontation in Iron County before, and that he was "a lover, not a fighter." R. 314:241,
257, 264-82.
Because defendant has not shown '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different,'" Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted),
defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail.
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III.

DEFENDANT'S PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM FAILS
WHERE THE PROSECUTOR REVEALED THE SOURCE OF DR.
DELCORE'S LETTER BEFORE IT WAS ADMITTED
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct because "Dr.

Delcore's statement constituted inadmissible hearsay, and was therefore inappropriately
brought before the jury." Aplt. Br. at 41. Alternatively, defendant claims the prosecutor
committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose "that the Iron County
Prosecutor, Scott Burns, was the author of the Delcore document, and that he and Dr.
Delcore are 'best friends.'" Aplt. Br. at 40. "Because the true origin of Dr. Delcore's
statement and his relationship to Mr. Burns were not properly disclosed," defendant
argues, the prosecutor's actions constituted a "fabrication of evidence" and a "fraud on
the court." Aplt. Br. at 40-41. The record does not support either of defendant's claims.
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, "'defendant must show that the remarks
called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching a verdict and, if so, that the remarks were harmful.'" State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT
App 295, lj 14, 13 P.3d 1060 (citations omitted). "'Because a trial court is in the best
position to determine an alleged error's impact on the proceedings, [this Court] will not
reverse a trial court's [ruling] on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of
discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (citation omitted).
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Here, the trial court concluded in denying defendant's post-trial motion:
the significant point is whether the proffered testimony is stipulated
to and both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to
the jury. It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as long as
the words have been agreed to by both sides.
R. 314:429; R. 258-59. The court then found—in a finding defendant does not attack on
appeal as clearly erroneous—that both sides agreed to the words in the letter here. R.
314:429; R. 258-59.
Because defense counsel agreed to the language in Dr. Delcore's letter and
stipulated to the letter's admission, defendant cannot show that the prosecutor improperly
referred to inadmissible hearsay evidence and thereby "called to the jurors' attention
matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" Tuckett,
2000 UT App 295, ^ 14. Thus, defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.
To the extent defendant's claim is that the prosecutor improperly withheld
evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), defendant provides no legal
authority to support a Brady claim. See Aplt. Br. at 40-42. Consequently, this Court
should reject the claim as inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)\State v.
Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1j 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073; State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998); State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2
(Utah App. 1990).
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In any case, defendant's claim is not supported by the record. Specifically,
defendant claims that "[a]t the hearing on Mr. Heil's Motion for New Trial, the trial court
first learned that the Iron County Prosecutor, Scott Burns, was the author of the Delcore
document, and that he and Dr. Delcore are 'best friends.'" Aplt. Br. at 40. On the
contrary, in denying defendant's motion, the trial court found that the origin of the letter
had been disclosed to both counsel and the court at trial. R. 258-60. Defendant does not
attack this finding as clearly erroneous. See Aplt. Br. at 40-42. Thus, contrary to
defendant's claims, there was no "fabrication of evidence" or "fraud on the court." Aplt.
Br. at 41.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 7A April 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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18
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19
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22
23
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S CONT'D

2

(May 3, 2002)

3

(Court called to order.)
THE JUDGE:

4

Okay.

Let me read into the record, I

5 wrote some notes last night after I got a, kind of a panic
6

call from Dr. Delcore at 3:30.

He was very dis^b^ayght.

He

7

said, you can't do this to me, Judge.

8

am I doing to you?

9

surgeries set for tomorrow beginning at 6:00 a.m., some can't

And I said well-, what

And he said, I have long-standing

10

wait.

Three of them I think he said would have physical

11

pain or, OR problems that needed to be addressed with surgery

12

right now.

13

yesterday.

14

true because this case has been, has been set for some

15

time.

16

single operation goes perfectly.

He said he was served with a subpoena just
I told him it was totally improper if that was

He said he would be done at 4:00 p.m. ojily if every

I asked him what he would say if he testified and

17
18

maybe it could be handled by A proffer.

He said Jeff Heil

19

is my patient.

20

hit by a wrench so that's what he wrote down in the patient's

21

file.

22

jury is a scaphoid fracture which could be caused by hitting,

23

by being hit by something, but more likely from falling down

24

or even throwing a punch.

25

being bent backwards like starting a motorcycle.

And he said that the patient reported being

Said he doesn't know how the jury occurred.

The

The injury comes from the wrist
I assume

STATE VS. HEIL
MAY 3, 2002
COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 172

1

it's this kind of motion.

2

something.

3

it was a ligament.

Resulting hyperextending

I couldn't read my notes, I guess, I think maybe

I looked for Mr. Dent's phone number in the

4
5

phonebook while he was still on the line, I only could see an

6

office number.

7

6:00 a.m., the most we will do is call you between surgeries

8

so the attorneys can verify that what I wrote down is

9

correct.

10

So I said, you go do the surgeries at

So that's what I did spur of the moment.

I

11

couldn't see in if fact he was only served a day earlier.

12

And you can double-check that.

13

MR. DENT:

14

Your Honor.

15

THE JUDGE:

16

MR. DENT:

17

THE JUDGE:

18

set for a long time.

19
20
21
22
23

He was served on the 30th of April,

MR. DENT:

A Tuesday for a Friday appearance?
Tuesday.
Well, but why so late?

This has been

We weren't sure exactly, Your Honor,

who our witnesses were going to be, w e —
THE JUDGE:

Well, but he saw him just a couple of

days after this incident last summer.
MR. DENT:

Well, I think that Mr. Heil had spoken

24

to a, to Dr. Delcore on the phone and they had talked.

25

had made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore myself.

And I

And I did
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<*

J*/\~1A

0*2v st *t

1
2

that other matter?
MR. DENT:

May we, Your Honor?
(Tape turned off.).

3
4
5
6

(In chambers on speaker phone).
THE JUDGE:

Are you still

there, Dr. Delcore?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE JUDGE:

9

Let me turn it on.

I am.
Okay.

Let me just say for the

record, this is Judge Braithwaite.

I'm in chambers.

I don't

10

have either attorney available and so I'm speaking with Mr.,

11

or Dr. Delcore on the speaker phone.

12

If you were called and asked what caused the

13

accident, I mean, what caused the injury in whatever terms

14

you want to use what would you say?

15

DR. DELCORE:

In my opinion a, with regard to the

16

injury sustained to Mr. Heil's wrist a, his injury is a

17

scaphoid fracture.

18
19
20

There is a little a, there i s —

THE JUDGE:

Come in.

Sorry.

Go ahead.

(Attorneys entered chambers).
DR. DELCORE:

Sure.

The mechanism of a scaphoid

21

fracture is well understood, there's been wealth of

22

biomechanical data done on live (short inaudible, no mic)

23

specimens, testing and, and thoroughly testing and

24

understanding the mechanism of injuries for scaphoid

25

fractures, as a vast wealth of, of basic scientific data
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1

states that the scaphoid really fails, it really fractures

2

in almost only one mechanism and that is with a hyperdorsal

3

flexion injury of the wrist, meaning the wrist is bent

4

backwards forcibly either, for example, from a fall on an

5

outstretched hand or a, a car crank, engine crank backfiring

6

and, you know, jerking the wrist back forcibly, or any other

7

mechanism somebody might want to a, think about which would

8

cause a wrist to be forced backwards a, in a violent

9

manner.

10
11

That is really the only way the scaphoid can fail

and fracture.
And to contrast that with a, the report of Jeff

12

that a, he may have sustained that injury from being struck

13

a, by a, a monkey wrench or a pipe or something.

14

clearly in medicine we leave, you know, any option a, open

15

just because that's the way we approach our profession.

Well a,

16

It is extremely unlikely if not almost impossible

17

to, to fracture a scaphoid with a concussion or a contusion

18

mechanism injury.

19

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

The attorneys joined me midway

20

through that.

I'm going to let them...

21

oath or anything but I'm sure you'll give an honest answer.

22

DR. DELCORE: Yes.

23

THE JUDGE:

You're not under

Let me ask if they have any questions

24

that they would like to ask you.

25

Mr. Garrett?
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MR. GARRETT:

1

Well, he said...

My question there

2

was the likelihood of a wrench hitting the wrist causing

3

that kind of a fracture.

4

nothing.

And you said that it was almost

5

DR. DELCORE:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

ask Dr. Delcore any questions?

8

MR. DENT:

Extremely unlikely if not impossible.
Okay.

Mr. Dent, would you like to

Doctor, a, Jeff was under the

9

impression that you had told him earlier that it was" quite

10

likely that was' caused by a blow to the wrist and m'ay have

11

been exacerbated by a, a backward flex.

12

DR. DELCORE:

My understanding, from my

13

understanding, not my understanding, my recollection was a,

14

on the first visit where Mr. Heil may be, you know, recalling

15

this, when he first came to my clinic in the midst of

16

obtaining an history he a, posed a question that seemed a

17

little a, awkward a, because usually when people present a,

18

with an injury there is no question, they know exactly what

19

happened and it's not a matter of a, could this have possibly

20

(inaudible word).

21

My recollection is that he did ask me is it

22

possible, quote, is it possible that this could have been

23

fractured by being struck by a, a monkey wrench or pipe or

24

something like that.

25

air and I said well, you know, anything is possible but it's

And you know, I, I looked up in the
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1

extremely unlikely.

2

it cracked it.

He says well, it's possible that, that

Because here's the, here's the issue.

3

With a

4

concussion injury or, you know, or something that strikes the

5

wrist in the back, that one it's not where the scaphoid is,

6

two, there was no bruising and no, no sign of soft tissue

7

trauma in that area to, to kind of concur with, with what he

8

was proposing that might have happened.

9

would, it would, if it were to it would create only a, a

And, and three, it

10

crack or would liked create a, at the very remotest

11

possibility it would only create a little crack or a dent in

12

whatever bone it struck, but it would not create a displaced

13

fracture.

14

fracture.

And Mr. Heil's injury was a displaced scaphoid

So then he kept on and said well, is it possible

15
16

that it might have cracked and then with the, you know,

17

subsequent altercation it a, you know, may have been then

18

displaced from, you know, whailing on him or punching him and

19

stuff.

20

could have cracked it and, and then it displaced further when

21

you punched.

And I said well that's, that's possible, maybe you

22

But the real question is is that likely.

And,

23

and being struck on the back of the wrist a, is just not a,

24

a typical mechanism of injury for a scaphoid fracture and

25

it would just be just unlikely.
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He said is it possible.

1
2

anything is possible.
MR. DENT:

3

In medicine we say

But it's not likely.
So a, I don't mean to be redundant, but

4

is it possible that a blow to the wrist with a cresent wrench

5

a, could have caused some initial trauma that was exacerbated

6

by punching?
DR. DELCORE:

7

I was, I have to say, just because

8

that's we do in medicine leave any, anything open to the

9

realm of possibility.
MR. GARRETT:

10

But it's extremely unlikely.
Dr. Delcore you stated that there

11

were, there was no laceration or bruising, contusion on the

12

arm?

13

DR. DELCORE:

Right.

And that's probably why I,

14

I maintain a, the opinion that it's probably unlikely, you

15

know, extremely unlikely.

16

corroborate a, his physical exam to say that this is where a

17

monkey wrench or whatever it was hit him.

18

hit him with that degree then you'd expect at least the, you

19

know, a bruise or some scraping or something on the back of

20

where he said he was hit on the back of his wrist.

21
22
23

Because I, I could not

You know, if it

Even though I still understand, that you have to
understand the scaphoid is not in the back of the wrist.
MR. GARRETT:

But you would have expected some

24

contusions, some lacerations, something from being hit with

25

that kind of force by a wrench?
STATE VS. HEIL
MAY 3, 2002
COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 299

1

DR. DELCORE:

2

MR. GARRETT:

3

THE JUDGE:

Correct.
All right.
Okay.

Thank you very much.

4

we'll work around you and not call you back.

5

apologize and I appreciate—
DR. DELCORE:

6

No.

I apologize.

I think

And I

I feel like, you

7

know, you're doing me a great favor by allowing me to not

8

interrupt the surgery day.

9

have more time to get a, my schedule changed.

10

THE JUDGE:

11

DR. DELCORE:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

THE WITNESS:

14

THE JUDGE:

Okay.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Bye.
Bye.

(Tape turned off).

15
16

THE BAILIFF:

17

THE JUDGE:

18

And I just feel bad that I didn't

Shall I bring the jury in or not?
I think we're ready for the jury

aren't we?

19

MR. DENT:

We are, Your Honor.

20

MR. GARRETT:

21

THE JUDGE:

Yes.
Okay.

How do you want to address

22

what we just resolved?

23

it, have the clerk read it, or what?

24

read it.

25

MR. GARRETT:

One of you read it, just publish

Yes.

I'm, I'm not going to

I think it would be fine to
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letter of his.

It' s not signed.

the cltih, ui ± wil]

She'll just lead whac he's got.

THE CLERK:
Delcore.

Y .';! be given a copy

"Statement of Randy G.
My name io i.^ndy G. Delcore.

I!m a n orthopedic surgeon,
a b o u t A i i g i i s t: 2 611: i, 2 0 0 Il '.

And on or
. - o c - •d J e f frey

H e i l f o r a n injury t o hi.s r i g h t

scaphoid

body.
Mr

'T-J' ^~-r<orted

+

'

rr

i 4"hat ho

received c m s ^njuiy by oeing struck vviln
"-- -.rench bv another person

- I though

like anything is possible, . n I:IV opinion

striking another person With h\s

right

hand causing the wrist-hand to rotate
backwards un^ cnus causing an injury, not
blunt: force trauma from a wrench or other
• .i I :i tl: lat tl lex: e was i i :
laceration or bruising on the wrist.'1.
THE J [ JDGE:

D : \ : i I x ic : .t i L = I: : : : E -c :i \ ?1 .) I: I = ;' s i ic: -t

here today?
MR. GARRETT:

No, that", s
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THE JUDGE:

1
2

Okay.

I'm glad you brought that

up.
There is some blue ink writing on there.

3
4

it on there after we talked to him.

5

seen it so it's not something that we're slipping by

6

anybody.

7
8
9

MR. GARRETT:

And both attorneys have

And Your Honor, I'll move that that

be admitted and made a part of the, the evidence.
THE JUDGE:

And that's received by stipulation.

10

And all we're waiting for then is the, is the jury

11

instructions.

12

(Short inaudible discussion with clerk).

13

THE JUDGE:

14

Okay.

15
16
17

Have you got them in order?

I'm going to read now instructions 10

through 25.
"#10. Testimony of the defendant.
The defendant is a competent witness in

18

his own behalf and his testimony should

19

be given the same consideration as you

20

give to any other witness, and you may

21

test the defendant's credibility or the

22

weight of his testimony as you would that

23

of other witnesses as given to you before

24

in these instructions.

25

I wrote

11.

Act and intent.

In every crime
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P-R 0 C -E-E-D-I-N-G-S

'I'HE JUDGE:

strangely.

Mate

versus Jeffrey H e i l .

And I see some subpoenas for jurors which is
-•p: ; •' ••

~nd l'i i: i 1ir ^ • : f and confused by a

subpoena for D r . Delcore.

D o we have subpoenaed witnesses,

urors in this case?
MR. JACKSON:
THE J U D G E :

Y e s , Your Honor.
And upon what authority do you claim to

1 1 lido
12 J

MR. JACKSON:

iiiL J U D G E :
i
1

kiilows you t o .

W e l l , I :cn' t know a law that

, i don't know of any law that

It seems to rr.c 1 M : ^ vo-j ' r? trv.ing to retry

: j this case with the jurors and ^.;__,..g

1

MR. JACKSON:

1 Q 11 subpoer ia \ i 'ji-^oes
19 ,:

THE JUDG1

LIIJI^ L U C A

.:;; ; ^ r e .

is the Court not allowing us to
. t; - -"'
asking you for authority.

On v;h.-;t

2 ' ' • 3 s i s d • :> } • • : I I c ] a :i i in ] :: i i ::: a i l :i o 11: i a t ?
2

I 'lie. JACKSON:

- -;i (.he basis that we can subpoena any

22

witness that we choose to prove

23

THE JUDGE:

24
25

you can do it, is what- w
T "ill !"

rA

. ,jic ,,.

ur case, Your Honor.
_> U lat you just feel line

rounds like.

.J/VLJV

I

I 11 t i e

s o n i c Li i i n i |

I I

I
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1

says that—
THE JUDGE:

2

Rule 606 talks about affidavits of

3

jurors where there's been an inappropriate contact with the

4

jurors.

5

mistakes may have been made were done with the, with the

6

recordings going and everything occurring that I'm aware of.

7

I talk with counsel in chambers, we videotape it, I make

8

decisions, and I rule from the bench.

But we don't have that in this case.

Whatever

Seems to me like defense counsel, both of you, are

9
10

treading on thin ice here as to whether, whether you've acted

11

inappropriately or not.
MR. JACKSON:

12

Well, we ought to have a finding

13

established to that effect, Your Honor, so that we have

14

something to take up on appeal.

15

finding that we've acted inappropriately—
THE JUDGE;

16

If the Court wants to make a

I, I won't know that until we've

17

finished the hearing here.

18

never seen this attempted or heard of it in 15 years on the

19

bunch.
MR. JACKSON:

20

But it's extremely unusual.

I've

Well I'm just, you know, we, we

21

intend to call jurors to establish a point about their

22

reliance on certain evidence.

23

whether or not it wants to give any weight or authority to

24

that.

25

from being able to subpoena witnesses to attempt to try to

The Court can determine

But I don't see any reason why we should be prohibited
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establish 01 ir position.
0] ,<: .] •

TI IE J ( JDGE:

I laving cited no authority to

take this unusual step, having no affidavits that allege that
i e i: 3 \ / a s a i i :i w; LJ p : , ; .

F o i: e x a i i: i p 1 e , \ 11 I • 31: e I 1 i a

.

seen this is where there's contact at lunch, a —
I tl i:i i ill :: t:l i- = i: e :i s sc i i i 3 ai zthor :i t/5 «;r c 1 1

•- ""K^ON:
that, Your Honor.
r

If I might have a moment.

™ ^ JUDGE:

0] vay.
. m a y d 11 o c u the Jourl 3 a c z e ri L 1 ^ n

,r. K . .

nay have just a moment here, Your Honor.
:

;

!

)

•

•

This is what.

going to do on this issue

!

. can suuw me ihai : ' -:i wrori
c

. -;oing :o quash the

':bpoenas for anv ^jrors to testify today.

I don't think

, .^re's any precedent or, or a^wvvance in the law for that
under the facts of this case.
r. .

-.Op'-jC-li.i--

So any iurors that were
1

t

i

r\n

more subpoenas are to be issued on this until the Court has
" !

-----

'

'

l

• -

:

••-.-!

MR. JACKSON:
Jj

'••'-

'

,

•

•'•

,;•:

:

v r i--• t. e

.

That's as to the issue of the

urors?
r

i'j-ii:J
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1

foundation of a jury trial being fair and impartial, and then

2

it's over and then you don't retry the case with the jurors

3

saying well if you'd known this, what about this evidence,

4

what about that evidence.

5

potential for a trial after trial.

6

could counter what about if you knew this or what about if we

7

gave you this type of an argument.

8

the, of the jury's decision.

It would be a never ending
Because then the state

It stops the finality of

If you research that and find that I'm wrong and

9
10

that there is a, an ability to do that then I'll readdress it,

11

and then if you can convince me then I'll allow subpoenas to

12

be issued.

13

me that would allow that.

14

defense to show that they have a right to do that.

But for today there has been no authority shown

15

MR. JACKSON:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

to go.

18

trial.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I think the burden is on the

Okay.
So, anybody here under subpoena is free

And we can address the rest of the motion for a new

MR. JACKSON:

That only leaves one other witness,

Your Honor, and that is Dr. Delcore.
THE JUDGE:
thing, doesn't it?

Oh, yes.

I think that does the same

Is he here?

MR. JACKSON:

He's not here but he was served with

a subpoena.
MR. EMERSON:

Your Honor, Greg Emerson on behalf of
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1

new facts forward.
THE JUDGE:

2

But that's the end result though, and

3

I've ruled the way I have.

4

bring it back up.

5

attorneys if they do bring it back up.

6

allowing you to bring this back up if you find some, some

7

authority to allow for this unusual procedure.

And frankly, I'd probably snap at

8

MR. EMERSON:

9

THE JUDGE:

10

trial.

11

it.

Usually once I rule you can't

I'm specifically

Thank you, Your Honor.
Let's move to your motion for new

It's your motion so I'll allow you to go first on

ARGUMENT BY MR. EMERSON

12
13

MR. EMERSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

14

The, the arguments on behalf of, of Mr. Heil are,

15

are I believe set forth in, in the motion for a new trial and

16

the, and the points of authorities.

17

like, Your Honor, to point out a couple of what I think are

18

key points.

19

However, I would just

The State versus Cummings says, sets forth again

20

that two prong test that I just mentioned.

And the first is

21

that it has to be, there has to be some evidence that the jury

22

was presented with or was, was allowed to consider that they

23

were not justified in considering.

24

there was a reasonable likelihood of a favorable outcome had

25

the jury not considered that evidence which they were not

The second prong is that
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1

justified in considering.

2

There is in this case the Delcore letter.

I have,

3

Your Honor, on numerous occasions reviewed the, the videotaped

4

proceedings including in chamber conferences between, between

5

counsel.

6

counsel that, that did address the Delcore issue when

And there is one in chambers conference between

7 Mr. Delcore was on the phone via conference and a, Mr. Garrett
8

and Mr., Mr. Dent were, were also present.
I, I failed to see at any point in the entire

9
10

taping, videotaping of the proceedings in the Heil matter

11

where the jury was advised that this was a letter that was

12

written by the county attorney's office.

13

And in fact, you know, there is, there is a

14

procedure, and I'm sure I'm not telling the Court anything it

15

doesn't already know, but if someone, if a witness is not

16

available to testify and there's a stipulated statement then

17

it's usually presented to the jury in the manner of this

18

witness is unable to testify, however, if they were called to

19

testify both parties have stipulated that this would be their

20

testimony.

21

reading of that statement generally by a, by the court clerk

22

as has been my experience.

23

read to the, read to the jury.

24
25

There's some kind of a, a precursor to the

But that, that statement is then

In this case it was presented to the jury as if it
were indeed a letter from Dr. Delcore, which it was not.

It
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1 was presented to the jury, it was presented to the jury as if
2

Dr. Delcore had written the letter and sent it to the, to the

3

county attorney's office or to the court.

4

And clearly... And again, I understand that the

5

Court isn't a, for the reasons stated going to allow jurors to

6

testify.

But it's our understanding that, that that letter

7 was, was critical in, in the decision made by the jury to
8

convict Mr. Heil of second degree felony assault.
I believe, and I, I want to point out to the

9
10

Court where I believe what the materiality of it is and

11

why—
THE JUDGE:

12
13

searching for the letter.

14

MR. EMERSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

If you wonder what I'm doing, I'm

after.

Oh,

I'm fine.

I am listening but that's what I'm

Do you have a copy of that?

17

MR. EMERSON:

We do, Your Honor.

18

(Inaudible discussion at counsel table.)

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. EMERSON:

Oh, here.

I've got it.

The letter, Your Honor, is, it begins

21

you know, I am Dr. Delcore, I am Randy Delcore.

22

the, I don't recall the exact language b u t —
THE JUDGE:

23
24
25

You're right.

I don't know

My name is Randy G.

Delcore.
MR. EMERSON:

As if it, as if it is indeed a letter
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1

from Dr. Delcore.

2

receiving into evidence and considering in its deliberations

3

something that purports to be what it is not.

4

be a letter from Dr. Delcore.

5

Dr. Delcore.

6

First of all, the jury is not justified in

It purports to

It is not a letter from

It's...

Whether he would have testified consistent with a

7

letter or statement or whatever we're calling it is not,

8

that's not at issue.

9

under oath, he was not cross examined.

10

He didn't testify, he was not placed
The jury did not have

an opportunity to assess Dr. Delcore's credibility on the
stand under oath.

12

And I will, I will point out as well, Your Honor,

13

that the, the conference call that I, that I observed on

14

videotape in chambers, Dr. Delcore was not placed under oath

15

at that time either.

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. EMERSON:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. EMERSON:

No.
So—
At least my memory is that he

wasn't.

So the statement or letter or

20

whatever we're calling it that was presented to the jury is

21

not a statement that was given under oath at any time.

22

for those reasons I, I do believe that the jury was not

23

justified in considering this piece of evidence.

24

come in through another, through another process, either live

25

testimony from him or a stipulated statement, again consistent

So

If it had
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1 with what I, with what I described a few minutes ago as to
2

he's not here and the parties have agreed that this is what

3

he would say, that's a different issue.

4

have that issue.

5

to be a letter written authored or drafted by Dr. Delcore.

But, but we don't

What we have is something that purports

6 And it was not either drafted by Dr. Delcore nor a letter
7

from him.

8

that.

9

The jury clearly was not justified in considering

The second, the second issue then in, in Cummings,

10

the second prong then is, had we not had that, it's a harmless

11

error analysis really, had we not had that is there a

12

reasonable likelihood...

13

to be certain that, that things would have been different,

14

just a reasonable likelihood.

15

We don't have to be, we don't have

Well that letter, Your Honor, attacks...

I think it

16

was, it was well crafted by the prosecution.

It attacks an

17

essential element of the affirmative defense.

18

issue here wasn't, wasn't whether or not there was an

19

altercation between, between Mr. Orton and Mr. Heil.

20

question was, was Mr. Heil's actions appropriate and were they

21

responsive to a perceived threat.

22

was the whole issue before the jury as I see it on a

23

self-defense theory, was Mr. Heil's actions consistent with

24

someone acting in self-defense.

25

attacks that issue directly by saying in essence I don't

The whole

The

That's, that's the, that

That purported letter
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1 believe Mr. Heil's version that he was struck with a, with a
2

wrench.

Well, that was Mr. Heil's affirmative defense is

3

that he responded to that attack from the, from the wrench by

4 Mr. Orton.
Well you now have, you now have an essential element

5
6

of the affirmative defense being attacked, Mr. Heil's

7

credibility being attacked by someone that was presented to

8

the jury initially by Mr. Dent as being Mr. Heil's defense

9

witness.

So now you have, you have a situation where you

10

have no, he's not under oath, it's not a letter drafted by

11

him, it's not even a letter.

12

attacking an essential element of an affirmative defense.

13

And it's also doing it in a, in a way that ridicules Mr.,

14

Mr. Heil by saying, you know, there's a statement in there

15

well I guess any, in this world anything is possible or

16

something to that effect.

17

clearly ridiculing Mr. Heil's version of events.

18

And now it's an attack, it's

You know, which is, which is

Well, that was the whole issue before the jury.

19

Not whether or not there was an altercation, whether or not

20

Mr. Heil's actions were responsive to a threat made by

21

Mr. Orton.

22

the heart of that issue.

23

That piece of purported evidence hits right to

Had that, had that letter...

And again I, I

24

understand that the Court, I understand the Court's position

25

with regards to the, to the subpoenas and, you know, there is
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1

an affidavit attached Eloise Stocks (phonetic), and I

2

understand that the, I don't know how the Court is going to

3

feel about that but perhaps that goes with the subpoenas

4

but—
THE JUDGE:

5
6

subpoenas.

7

wife?

I, I think that goes with the

This is a small town.

8

MR. JACKSON:

9

THE JUDGE:

That Clair Stocks's

Yes, Your Honor.
Who is Mr. Jackson's father's best

10

friend.

So we've got everybody.

11

friends with Randy Delcore.

12

But anyway, go ahead.

Scott Burns says he best

It's kind of a mess that way.

13

MR. EMERSON:

14

The, I mean, the issue here as far as the, as far as

15
16

I, I understand.

the Delcore letter appears to be, to be fairly simple.
Your Honor, there's, there's a phrase that, that's

17

used by, by those of us on the defense side I think, or at

18

least in my experience, quite often when we're, we're pleading

19

with the Court for some kind of an allowance or something, and

20

we say in the interest of justice thinking that, that to take

21

the high road and to kind of, you know, work on, on Your Honor

22

in that way is effective.

23

But in this case I really do think that the interest

24

of justice requires that there be a new trial.

The interest

25

of justice requires that if there is a question that is this
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1

significant, that addresses the very heart of the defense's

2

theory, and it's really decided or appears to be decided

3

conclusively by the jury based on something that was not

4

justifiably put before them, neither a letter, not under

5

oath.

It just, in the interest of justice there has to be a

6 new trial.
7

look and say well, you know, there's ample evidence.
Well, there's ample evidence of an altercation,

8
9

It just does not appear to me that the Court can

that's correct.

There's ample evidence that there were

10

injuries sustained by Mr. Orton.

11

undeniable.

12

issue is the self-defense.

13

that.

14

Those, those...

That is absolutely

But that's not the issue.

The

That purported letter attacks

The, the opposition by the prosecution states,

15

really, it really addresses the in chambers issues with the

16

Delcore letter and not, not whether or not they were justified

17

in presenting that to the jury.

18

see anywhere, I mean, I don't see some of the things that are,

19

that are, that are presented in the opposition.

20

didn't see those things happening in chambers like a

21

stipulation or a discussion of necessarily of what a, how that

22

letter came, letter came about.

23

Well, quite frankly I don't

I don't, I

One thing in the opposition that did kind of strike

24

me as being unusual is there was the statement in the

25

opposition that said that they were anticipating that
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1

Dr. Delcore would not show up.

2

of that and how they had time to prepare that, that purported

3

letter from Dr. Delcore I think is, I don't know the answer to

4

that, Your Honor, but I do think it's something that should

5

be, that raises an eyebrow.

6

had advance notice that Dr. Delcore wasn't going to go and the

7

defense did not?

8

they had the opportunity to draft this statement, and the

9

defense did not?

10

How they had advance notice

Why is it that the prosecution

Why did they have such advance notice that

And the, the opposition states that, that Mr. Dent

11

was advised beforehand that this letter wasn't written by

12

Dr. Delcore but was in fact written by Scott Burns.

13

on the videotape or the official record as I see it, nothing

14

in there suggests that that was the case.

15

something that occurred in the hallway I don't know.

16

I have no way of knowing that.

17

record is and the record does not reflect that there was, that

18

there was a disclosure in any kind of detail whatsoever as to

19

the origin of that letter.

Nothing

If that was
I have,

But the record is what the

20

And I do think that the Court, I do think that the

21

Court should consider that, not just how it was presented to

22

the jury but how this, how the whole letter came about and how

23

the prosecution was able to anticipate and, and draft that

24

letter and, and the defense had no knowledge of it until such

25

time as Dr. Delcore was on the phone on the conference call in
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1 chambers.
The, the second issue is ineffective assistant of

2
3

counsel.

That's never, Your Honor, at least from my personal

4

point of view, an easy thing for an attorney to, you know, to

5

raise against another member of the Bar.

6

actually been a disclosure to Mr. Dent by the prosecution that

7

this letter was indeed not a letter, and it was not drafted by

8

Dr. Delcore but rather it was drafted by, by Scott Burns or

9

something from the county attorney's office, had that

However, had there

10

admission or disclosure been made to Mr. Dent, Mr. Dent

11

clearly, clearly had an obligation, a reasonable common sense

12

obligation to say wait a minute, I'm not going to allow a

13

critical piece of evidence, which isn't evidence, which is

14 manufactured by someone other than who it purports to be
15

drafted by, to go before the jury that, that directly attacks

16

an essential element of our affirmative defense.

17

It's, it's one way or the other.

It was either

18

inappropriate to present it to the jury and it was

19

prosecutorial misconduct by not disclosing it, or if it was

20

disclosed it was Mr. Dent's ineffectiveness that allowed it

21

to be presented to the jury in the form that it was.

22

But in either sense, Your Honor, and it doesn't

23

really matter, it doesn't really matter which one it is.

24

What matters is the jury got ahold of a piece of, of a piece

25

of paper that was not what it was purported to be, should not
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1

have been given to them, and was absolutely critical, it

2

appears, in their decision to convict Mr. Heil.

3

Mr. Heil is the last person of all the players in

4

that game, the last person who should suffer the consequences

5

of either inappropriate behavior or failure to act

6

appropriately on the part of Mr. Dent.
So any way you look at it it should not have been

7
8

presented and it does, it is, it does form the basis,

9

justifiable basis for granting a motion for a new trial.
The third, the third issue, Your Honor, is whether

10
11

or not pursuant, pursuant to the a, to the code there was

12

evidence that this whole issue on the a, the class A

13

misdemeanor versus second degree or third degree felony

14

assault, whether or not there was substantial evidence or, or

15

substantial injury or serious injury as defined—
THE JUDGE:

16

This strikes me as having absolutely no

17

merit whatsoever.

18

photos at the prelim, I heard the testimony.

19

extremely serious injury to him.

20

down to a misdemeanor level is beyond me.

21

me how this broken jaw and...
Anyway, go ahead.

22
23
24
25

But go ahead and attack it.

I saw the
It was an

How this, how this drops
Please explain to

Have you looked at the

pictures?
MR. EMERSON:

I have, Your Honor.

It's a, it's

going to be a challenge but I'll try to explain it.
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1

THE JUDGE:

All right.

2

MR. EMERSON:

The...

There is, there is no

3

question but that, and, and I'm using layman's terms here as I

4

believe Mr. Dent did in, in his opening statement, as a layman

5

would use the term, there was serious injury.

6

question about that.

There's no

If I were in Mr. Orton's position and I suffered a,

7
8

half of the injuries that he suffered as a result of that

9

there's no question that I would say that those were serious

10

injuries.

11

pictures, they certainly evidence, they certainly evidence

12

injury, serious injury in layman's terms.

13

So I agree with the Court in that sense.

The

But I think that the code makes a distinction

14

between serious and substantial.

15

anybody, if any one of us in common conversation, not as

16

attorneys or as a judge, but just as, you know, two

17

individuals, I think we would call what the code calls

18

substantial we would call serious in that context.

19

And I believe that if

But I think there is a distinction for a reason and

20

it is not a distinction without a difference.

I believe that

21

the evidence that's presented to the jury when you're talking

22

about that technical distinction, and it's, again it's, it's

23

there for a reason.

24

to the jury that it is, that it falls within the definition in

25

the code of serious as opposed to substantial.

I think that the evidence has to be clear
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Again understanding, I understand what the Court

1
2

is saying, I understand the Court's position.

It was a

3

serious injury.

4

jury as far as I could tell on the tape, Your Honor, that,

5

clear evidence as far as I could tell, that it fit the

6

definition of the code as to serious injury, that it appeared

7

to be more, a substantial injury.

8

Court's time with, with that point.

9

point.

But there wasn't evidence presented to the

I don't want to waste the
I believe I've made that

But for those reasons, Your Honor, as best I can, I

10
11

believe that for those reasons, Your Honor, that the Court

12

should grant the defense motion for a new trial, that there is

13

substantial justification for doing so, and it is in my

14

opinion, Your Honor, essential to the interest of justice that

15

Mr. Heil be given a fair trial, again, and one that does not

16

have the issues, the prejudicial issues that are raised by, by

17

the Delcore letter.

18

And with that I'll submit it, Your Honor.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

Let me just say too, I was not happy with the way

The state's position?

21

this case was delivered to me basically starting from before

22

it tried.

23

disclosed this to both counsel.

24

or not letter, a panic call from Dr. Delcore the night before

25

saying why are you, literally, Judge, why are you doing this

And I disclosed this before the trial started and I
I mean, I get a panic letter,
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1

to me, I've got, I forget what the figure was, 10, 11, 12

2

patients undergoing surgery tomorrow.

3

can't, I can't do this and continue my surgeries.

4

can on some of them, but others are in pain.

5

reschedule them for a week later there are going to be people

I just got served, I
Yes, I

If I have to

6 with broken bones with excruciating pain for another week, or
7 whatever the time period was, until he could get another
8

surgery day scheduled.
And so I had to scramble with the, with the hand

9
10

that I was dealt.

And I told him no, I'm not going to put

11

people through physical pain and suffering because somebody

12

wasn't subpoenaed on time or...
And I don't know.

13

Maybe, maybe Mr. Heil presented

14

this to Mr. Dent as somebody to be subpoenaed because

15

absolutely he's going to be, Dr. Delcore is going to be in his

16

court.

17

Anyway, I was given that.

And we started with the

18

trial, I disclosed what had happened, I made rulings as I did,

19

right or wrong.

20

through, and that record can go up on appeal.

21
22
23
24
25

But I think I made a record all the way

But it's your chance to respond and, and go ahead,
Mr. Garrett.
ARGUMENT BY MR. GARRETT
MR. GARRETT:

Well first, Judge, defense counsel

makes some strong allegations I think against both the bench
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1

and myself.

2

here for the trial and, and is not aware of everything that

3

went on.

4

made a full and fair disclosure of the origin of that

5

letter.

6

Particularly in light of the fact that he wasn't

You and I were present and, and I believe the state

That letter was prepared the morning of, of the

7

second day of trial, I believe, as Dr. Delcore and Scott Burns

8

are friends and had a talk about his not being able to get to

9

court that day.

Scott Burns prepared a letter of the

10

statements that Dr. Delcore would make if he were called to,

11

to testify.

12

never signed and so was the jury.

13

was never placed on the, on the letter itself.

14

You were well aware of the fact the letter was
Dr. Delcore's signature

In fact, we had a chance to talk with Dr. Delcore

15

over the phone, we verified that the statements in the letter

16

were consistent with the statements over the phone.

On that

17 basis defense counsel, myself and you stipulated that the
18

letter should come in representing Dr. Delcore's testimony so

19

that he wouldn't have to be present at the trial to testify,

20

allowing him to stay in surgery.

21

You could have continued the trial possibly to

22

the next Monday requiring Dr. Delcore to come and testify

23

and then his statements would have been the same as, as what

24

was reflected in the letter.

25

proffered the, the testimony to the jury based on the

That didn't happen.

We, we
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1

telephone conversation that we had with Dr. Delcore.

2

THE JUDGE:

3

the date of the trial?

4

MR. EMERSON:

5

I don't think I've got a...

May 3rd, or May 3rd was the

conviction, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

6

What was

I believe it was a two day trial.

Yes.

It was a two day trial.

I didn't

7 have an open day, I didn't have another open two days for a
8

while after that and definitely not Monday or Tuesday.

9

Anyway, go ahead.
MR. GARRETT:

10

Anyway, it's the state's position

11

that, that we were all satisfied with the contents of the

12

letter given the telephone conversation that we had with

13

Delcore.

14

So basically what, what it comes down to, I'll be

15

succinct here, I'll be, I'll be rapid with my arguments.

16

it boils down to is whether or not there was an error that

17

existed by allowing that letter to come in.

18

stipulated proffered testimony he has to look at it in terms

19

of plain error.

20

exists, whether the error should have been obvious to the

21

trial court, and then the reasonable likelihood of a more

22

favorable, favorable outcome.

23

What

Once you have

And the three criteria are whether an error

And I submit, Your Honor, that they cannot prove

24

that there is a more reasonable likelihood of a more favorable

25

outcome because they have shown, they have not been able to
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1
2

they have not made a showing of prejudice.
And I submit to you there was ample evidence in the

3

way of testimony from Fred Orton that if the jury believed it,

4

to sustain the verdict.

5

they would have been, the outcome would have been different if

6

they had not considered the Delcore letter.

7

And there, there's no showing that

And you've made it clear how you feel about the

8

sufficiency of the evidence claim and, and I've briefed it, so

9

I'll submit it on the brief.

10

THE JUDGE:

What about the defense claim that there

11

wasn't this, I don't remember, that it wasn't disclosed that

12

Scott Burns wrote the letter?

13

MR. GARRETT:

And my argument is, and I'm going off

14

memory, I've seen the tape too and it wasn't, on the record it

15

wasn't disclosed.

16

Mr. Dent whether or not he was a made aware of Scott Burns and

17

Randy Delcore's relationship, and he indicated to you in

18

chambers that he was.

19

But I distinctly remember you asking

THE JUDGE:

I wish that the orthopedic surgeon and

20

the county attorney weren't best friends.

21

case along.

22

would help me not have a muddy situation here.

23

what the situation was in Cedar City, Utah at that time.

24

Friendships exist.

25

It would help this

But that's what the situation was.

The Stocks are great people.

And that
But that's

I didn't mean earlier
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1

to imply anything improper.

2
3

MR. JACKSON:

No.

I know you didn't.

That's just

the way we have it here.

4

THE JUDGE:

5

All right.

Anyway, go ahead.

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. EMERSON

6

MR. EMERSON:

Your Honor, just a, just a few points

7

in reply.

8

position is we're going to take cover in this, in this safe

9

harbor area, this area that, that precludes us from really

The first is, it appears that the prosecution's

10

getting into the minds of the jurors.

11

did, Your Honor, they would tell you look, we didn't trust

12

either one of them and then when we saw this Delcore letter

13

that was it, we said hey, wait a minute—

14

THE JUDGE:

Because I think if we

Well, I'm not going to let you

15

subpoena, I'm not going to let you tell me what the jurors,

16

were thinking either.

17

MR. EMERSON:

I understand that, Your Honor.

But

18

the, but point is that there's not a safe harbor, that there

19

isn't a safe harbor that says hey, wait a minute, you can't

20

get into deliberations.

21

The Court on its own can look at the evidence and

22

can say hey, wait a minute, maybe there's ample evidence by,

23

by Mr. Orton that there was injury here, maybe there's ample

24

evidence of an altercation,, all of that we don't, we do not

25

dispute any of that.
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1

there was self-defense, that there was justified

2

self-defense.

3
4

That's the issue that's attacked by the letter.
It is material.

And they were not justified in hearing it.

5

The, you know, this safe harbor idea well hey, wait,

6

you can't prove it because you can't get into the minds of the

7

jurors.

8

we can't, we're not permitted to do so.

9

Well, that's blatantly unfair.

Because he's right,

But the Court can and should look and say well, wait

10

a minute, I understand there's ample evidence as to all these

11

other factors.

12

what way does this Delcore letter, which we know now is not

13

from Delcore nor a letter, in what way does that address that

14

issue?

15

Right at the heart of it.

16

But how about as to self-defense?

In, in

Well, it strikes at the heart of it, Your Honor.

And then you've got to look and say okay, well, what

17

other evidence is there that would support a finding that

18

this, that this use of force... Use of force.

19

police officers so I'm used to speaking in those terms.

20

But the, the force used by, by Mr. Heil, what

I represent

21

evidence is there absent the Delcore letter that says look,

22

this whole wrench thing is a bunch of balogna, paraphrasing.

23

Absent that what evidence is there?

24

two individuals, Mr. Heil and Mr. Orton, and that's it.

25

There's no witnesses, there's no physical evidence, there's no

There's the statement by
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1 video camera, there's nothing.
THE JUDGE:

2

We have that situation in cases every

3

day though.

For example, a date rape.

It's two different

4

versions and the jury decides, and we have no tie breaker

5 witness.
6
7

MR. EMERSON:

I understand, Your Honor.

this case the tie breaker was Mr. Delcore.

8 Mr. Delcore.

But in

And it was not

It was Mr. Scott Burns encloaking himself in

9 Mr. Delcore's name and position and relationship.

He

10

exploited the relationship that, that Mr. Heil had with his

11

own doctor.

12

And Mr. Dent came up right up front in opening

13

statement and said you're going to hear from Dr. Delcore, he's

14

the doctor that treated Mr. Heil.

15

particularly, particularly egregious, Your Honor, is that

16

Scott Burns put himself in Mr. Delcore!s position and

17

testified as if he were Dr. Delcore, and he was not.

18

That makes this

Well these things that, that apparently happened

19

outside the record like a disclosure or whatever, none of that

20

is on the record.

21

Mr. Garrett is right.

I was not here.

But what I

22

do know, Your Honor, is what the Court of Appeals if this

23

thing goes any further or what anybody else will know, and

24

that's only what's on the record.

25

Mr. Emerson is wrong because he's only looking at the

To say well, well
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1

record, he's not looking at all of this, this peripheral

2

stuff, or this stuff that happened on the periphery.

3

Well, I don't have to look at that.

4

record.

5

None of that is on the

The record shows very clearly that there was no

6

disclosure either to Mr. Dent, to the Court, at least on

7

the record, nor to the jury that this was a letter written

8

by Scott Burns who happens to be a best friend of

9

Dr. Delcore.

10

Looking at that, Your Honor, it is muddy waters.

11

And can you say look, in a small town, you know, you're going

12

to run into these situations where you have friendships and

13

people are...

14

mean, I noticed that Your Honor has a, has a particular, in

15

doing the a, the voir dire Your Honor really got into those

16

issues as to who knew who and what their connections were so I

17

see that there's some sensitivity to that.

And I, and I noticed, Your Honor, and a, I

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. EMERSON:

20
21

It's a common problem.
I could see from the, from the jury

selection process, Your Honor.
But the point is that in this case it's particularly

22

suspect when the prosecution is contacted prior.

The

23

prosecution who happens to be, the county attorney happens to

24

be a best friend of Dr. Delcore, has the opportunity to put

25

whatever he wants to in a letter and can put on Dr. Delcore's
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1 name tag and present that to a jury in an inappropriate
2 manner.
It's either inappropriate if it wasn't disclosed or

3
4

it's incompetence on the part of Mr. Dent if it was.

5 way it's wrong.
6

Either

And Mr. Heil is the one who has suffered and

he should not suffer, he should not suffer.
If the evidence is clear, Your Honor, there's no

7
8

harm in having a new trial, bring Dr. Delcore forward, have

9

him testify in an appropriate manner that protects the

10

process.

The process, there has to be some integrity in the

11

process.

To turn, to turn away and say look, we had some back

12

scenes conversations between the attorneys and whatever and,

13

you know, trust us, everything is okay here, just trust us.

14

That's not acceptable.

15

The process has to have some integrity.

16

if that letter is allowed to stand with this jury, with the

17

jury that was here.

18

stand as is, the process has no integrity.

19

It doesn't

And if that conviction is allowed to

The prosecution through Mr. Garrett, or Mr. Burns

20

is gone now, but Mr. Garrett or anybody else can manufacture

21

evidence or, or create statements in the form, purporting to

22

be in the form of a letter and present it to the jury.

23

would never allow that, Your Honor, beforehand, ever.

24
25

We

The interest of justice, the integrity of the, of
the process says this is way too close.

And if a man is
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1

going to be sentenced to jail time we'd better make, we'd

2

better make sure that the process was fair.

3

to be fair.

4

The process has

And, Your Honor, if that means that Your Honor has

5

to, has to acknowledge look, and I'm not suggesting that this

6

is the case, but if it means that Your Honor or Mr. Dent or

7

Mr. Garrett or Mr. Burns has to say you know what, we, we

8

never intentionally made a mistake, we never did anything

9

intentionally to cause any problems here for Mr. Heil.

10

However, the process appears shakey.

We have to do the right

11

thing.

12

motion for a new trial.

13

Dr. Delcore's testimony is what it is, it is what it is.

And the only right thing in this case is to grant the
And if it turns out again

But at that point in time, Your Honor, we'll know

14
15

that there was a fair process and that Mr. Heil had a fair

16

opportunity, a fair opportunity to present his case and

17

to, and to cross examine those who would testify adverse to

18

him.

19

Finally, Your Honor, the, the, the issue, the issue

20

of the subpoenas.

The Court made perfectly clear to Mr. Dent

21

that the reason that the Court found itself in the predicament

22

that it was, that it found itself in was because Mr. Dent had

23

failed to issue the subpoenas with, with, in adequate time and

24

he didn't give proper notice.

25

into what we have today.

Well, that kind of snowballed
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But again, ray, my point, and I know I've said it a

1
2

number of times, the process lost its integrity somewhere

3

along the way regardless of who, of who did it or why they did

4

it, or if it was inadvertent, whatever it was.

5

matter.

6

convicted because of a letter that was presented to the jury

7

that addresses the very heart of his defense.

8

stopped it.

9

stop it.

10
11

It doesn't

What matters is there's a person who stands

And no one

We don't care whose responsibility it was to

It was not stopped, it should have been.
The motion should be granted for those reasons, Your

Honor.

12

RULING

13

THE JUDGE:

Let me take these in, in a different

14

order.

15

evidence to sustain the verdict.

16

that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reach the,

17

the verdict that they did.

18

It was their call.

19

serious bodily injury, that there wasn't protracted loss or

20

impairment of function of any body member or organ, or they

21

could find him guilty.

22

think that there is sufficient evidence to support their

23

verdict.

24
25

This is the second point that there wasn't sufficient
I'm denying that.

I think

They could have gone either way.

They could have found that there wasn't

And they went with the guilty and I

So I'm denying that one.
Then go back to number one.

As to the Delcore

statement, I've already said this isn't the way I like to see
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1

cases develop but it's, it's what happened.

2

call the night before.
There was the letter.

3

Dr. Delcore did

It was presented to the, to

4

the jury as a proffer.

We often have proffers submitted to

5

juries, either verbal or written.

6

written it's written by the defense attorney, sometimes it's

7

written by the prosecution, sometimes the proffer is verbally

8

stated by the defense attorney, sometimes it's by the

9

prosecuting attorney.

And sometimes if it's

But in either event the significant

10

point is whether that proffered testimony is stipulated to and

11

both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to

12

the jury.

13

long as the words have been agreed to by both sides.

14

were in this case.

It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as
And they

15

And so I'm denying the motion on that.

16

The toughest one for me to decide is the third one

17

as to whether or not Mr. Dent's performance was deficient,

18

below an objective standard and resulted in prejudice to the

19

defendant.

20

My feeling at the conclusion of that trial was that

21

Mr. Dent did the best he could with the facts that he had and

22

the case that was presented to him by the defendant.

23

reading of Mr. Dent was that he was surprised by

24

Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the

25

defendant had led him to believe.

My
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For that matter, and I'll disclose this, when

1
2

Dr. Delcore called me he said well I just write down, when I

3

put what happened I write down what my patient tefls me

4 happened, I'm not making an independent assessment, I just
5 wrote that down.
6

Then went on to say basically what he said

in his, in this letter.
It's my reading of Dr. Delcore that he would have

7
8

been a very helpful, well, that his testimony would have

9

fallen on the side of assisting the prosecution, would have

10

helped their case much more than it would have the defendant,

11

and that what was given to the jury in written form was much

12 milder, less prejudicial to the defendant than if either side
13

had had him on the witness stand that day.
I have some question about whether his, Mr. Dent's

14
15

performance was deficient in that regard.

I can't say that it

16

was deficient on his part or if he was misled by his client.

17

But either

18

prejudiced by Dr. Delcore not testifying, and that Mr. Dent

19

not having him subpoenaed earlier than two days prior to the

20

trial had a negative impact on the case.

21

subpoenaed a week or two earlier and Dr. Delcore had been here

22

I think there's, that just increases the chances of conviction

23

because of the reasons I've just stated.

24

testimony was more beneficial to the prosecution than to the

25

defense.

either way I don't think that the defendant was

If he had him

It was more of, his
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I welcome you to take this up on appeal.

1
2

I've made the correct rulings.

3

haven't it will be reversed.

I think

The record is there.

If I

I've allowed Mr. Heil out on work release after a

4
5

period of no work release.

6

completing that but, how far, how close are you, when is

7

your... I can't remember when he's out.
MR. JACKSON:

8
9

I think he has about another 40 days,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

10
11

I don't know how close he is to

Has he earned some credit for good

time?

12

MR. EMERSON:

He has, Your Honor.

13

MR. JACKSON:

He has.

14

MR. EMERSON:

Your Honor, based on the, on the

15

Court's position we would ask that the Court certified the

16

record for appeal and stay the execution of the sentence.
THE JUDGE:

17
18

under the rules.

19

it.

You can do and then I'll react once I see

We'll be in recess.

20

MR. GARRETT:

21

THE JUDGE:

22

That motion has to be made in writing

Thank you, Judge.
The state will prepare the order.

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded.

23
24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

1
2
STATE OF UTAH

)

) SS.

3
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

4
5
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

6
7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify

8

that I received the electronically recorded videotape 7/25/02

9

in the matter of STATE VS. HEIL, hearing date July 25, 2002,

10

and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full,

11

true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded and

12

transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 396

13

through 432, inclusive except where it is indicated that the

14

tape recording was inaudible.

15
16

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 11th day of March,
2003.

17
18
PSNNYT'CY A6BOTT,

19

"cfruR'T

REPORTER

License ^-22-1 02811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04

20
21
22
23
24

<P2«^

ycXK*

PEKNVC,

ABBOTT

•• • '-• miC'SUTEoium

* * - » ? • ' , ; <**.- ^OUTH 775 EAST
W
-V
S A L £ M . U T 84653
>
^ "'
Q.OUM EXP 9-24-2004

25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
PAGE 432

Addendum D

fy
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

e

^tyc

/e

*

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

vs.
Case No. 011500873
JEFFREY ALAN HEIL,
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion for a
New Trial, filed on June 28, 2002. The State of Utah filed an Objection thereto on July 16, 2002.
Defendant has not replied.
A hearing on the matter was held on July 25, 2002, Defendant was present and was
represented by his counsel of record, J. Bryan Jackson and Gregory S. Emerson. The State of
Utah was represented by Iron County Attorney Scott Garrett.
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties on this issue, having heard the
parties' arguments and evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as
follows:

BACKGROUND
This matter arises from a jury trial, which was held on May 2nd, and 3rd, 2002. Defendant
Jeffrey Alan Heil ("Defendant") was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony.

00261

-2Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial in this matter for three (3) different reasons:
[1] Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial by reason of prosecutorial misconduct
involving the testimony of Dr. Randy G. Delcore, a Cedar City physician who treated Defendant
after the altercation giving rise to these charges.
Dr. Delcore was not subpoenaed until 2 days before trial in this matter, and was scheduled
to be in surgery all day on the day that his presence was sought. Because of this lack of notice, the
Court released Dr. Delcore from his subpoena, and instead had his testimony read into the record by
the clerk. However, the "letter" that the clerk read into the record, and to the jury, was not drafted
by Dr. Delcore. It had been drafted by Scott M. Burns, the previous Iron County Attorney, and
prepared for Dr. Delcore's signature. Dr. Delcore, however, had never been able to come sign the
letter. The origin of the letter was disclosed to the Court and Defense Counsel at that time, Mr.
Harold Dent, Jr., and the content of the letter had been confirmed with Dr. Delcore via telephone by
the Court with both attorneys present. In the course of this phone call, the Court even added the
language "And that there was no laceration or bruising on the wrist," to the letter to make the letter
more consistent with Dr. Delcore's testimony over the phone. Mr. Dent stipulated to the evidence
in the letter, and acquiesced in its reading to the jury, as Dr. Delcore was unavailable.
The fact that the letter was not drafted by Dr. Delcore was not disclosed to the jury, although
defense counsel and the Court were both aware of its origins.
[2] Defendant also argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the
conclusion that Mr. Heil had caused "serious" injury to the victim in this case, and asserts that the
evidence as presented is only sufficient to support a finding of "substantial" injury, which only

00260

-3supports a Class A Misdemeanor charge, rather that a Second Degree Felony, as Defendant was
convicted of here.
[3] Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on ineffectiveness of his
trial counsel. Defendant complains that his trial counsel should have kept the letter with Dr.
Delcore's testimony out of evidence. He also complains of actions or omissions of his counsel at
trial in that his trial counsel failed to make objections to certain evidence, failed to call witnesses,
failed to issue subpoenas in a timely manner, and failed to effectively cross-examine witnesses.
ANALYSIS
I.

THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVING THE
LETTER THAT WAS READ INTO EVIDENCE AS BOTH THE COURT AND
MR. DENT WERE AWARE OF ITS ORIGIN, AND THE FACTS OF THE
ORIGIN OF THE LETTER DO NOT NECESSITATE A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant complains of prosecutorial misconduct in that the letter read into evidence as Dr.

Delcore's, had not actually been written by Dr. Delcore, but had been drafted and prepared for Dr.
Delcore's signature by former Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns.
However, the origin of the letter was disclosed to both the Court and to Mr. Dent, and the
content thereof had been verified by the Court via telephone with both attorneys present and able to
question Dr. Delcore as to the letter's contents. The letter, and its reading into evidence, were
stipulated to by Mr. Dent. Defendant complains that Dr. Delcore was not subject to crossexamination on his testimony, and that the jury was not allowed to hear thgrhe is close friends with
Scott Burns, the prosecutor and drafter of the letter.
However, Mr. Dent had stipulated to the reading of the letter into evidence, and made no

oo

-4effort to tell the jury about the origin of the letter, or of the friendship between Dr. Delcore and Scott
Bums (or to introduce any type of doubt as to the letter's contents therefrom). Therefore, Defendant
cannot now complain about the introduction of the letter into evidence by its reading, or contend that
it somehow has improper origins.
Finally, it is the language of the stipulated document that is important, not the author.
Proffers are often written (or stated) by the prosecutor, or by the defense. Which person writes (or
speaks) the proffered testimony is not important. The crucial requirement is that both sides stipulate
to the proffered testimony - the agreed upon language — as was done in this case .
Although the jury was unaware that the letter that was read into evidence as Dr. Delcore's
testimony had not been drafted by Dr. Delcore, there is no indication that the jury's verdict would
have been any different.1 There was no prosecutorial misconduct involved here because the State
informed both the Court and Mr. Dent as to the origin of the letter, which was subsequently
confirmed by the Court and by counsel.
II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT OF SUSTAIN A
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO A CHARGE INVOLVING "SERIOUS" BODILY
INJURY.
The evidence which was presented at trial was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict to Utah

Code Ann.§ 76-6-601(10), which involves "serious" bodily injury, as opposed to §76-6-601(11)
involving "substantial" bodily injury as proposed by Defendant.

Even if admitting the letter into evidence was in error, it was harmless error. First, had the Court
compelled Dr. Delcore's presence, the jury would have heard identical testimony to what was stated in the letter.
Second, the jury had ample evidence to convict Defendant absent the letter containing Dr. Delcore's testimony.

oo

-5Defendant asserts that sufficient evidence to support a finding of "serious" bodily injury was
not presented to the jury, and that the evidence presented was only sufficient to support a finding of
a "substantial" injury.
"In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 2 {quoting State v.
Boyd, 2002 UT 30). As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Layman, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah
1999), a conviction will only be overturned for insufficient evidence "when it is apparent that there
is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant has committed the crime." Further, as the court
stated in State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), "so long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all of the requisite elements of the crime can be
reasonably made, out inquiry stops." Lamm, at 231. Put another way, the Court will not substitute
its own judgment for that of the jury as long as there was some evidence which supports their
decision.
UCA 76-6-601 defines "Serious Bodily Injury" as "bodily injury that creates or causes
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." (emphasis added). As the presence of the word "or"
indicates, this language is phrased to be in the alternative. Evidence of any one of these different
factors is sufficient to support a finding of "serious" bodily injury. The jury heard the testimony of
Dr. Pearson that "the fracture [of the victim's jaw] on the right side is not one we can fix," and will
"never be as good as it was before."
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-6This evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of the jury that the victim suffered "protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ," and is therefore sufficient to
sustain a guilty verdict to a charge involving "serious" bodily injury.2 The jury also heard the
testimony of the victim, Fred Orton, that Defendant tackled him from behind; that Defendant hit him
in the side of the head in "his eye-bone," and then hit him in his jawbone twice, with a rock, and he
felt it break each time; that he lost track of the blows and lost consciousness; that he thought he was
going to die ("kiss your ass goodbye," he thought); that when he came to his body had been moved
to the middle of the road and Defendant then kicked him in the ribs and head, and said "I told you
Fd kill you" if his cows got in Defendant's hay again; and "I'll beat you to death"; that he "felt his
brain swelling" and suffered "lots of pain"; that he had surgery requiring a tracheotomy to keep
breathing; and that he had severe headaches for a month. From all of this the jury could reasonably
infer that Defendant also created a substantial risk of death.
III.

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT MR. DENT'S PERFORMANCE
FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD AND THAT DEFENDANT WAS
PREJUDICED AS A RESULT.
There is no showing that Defendant was prejudiced in any way by any alleged deficient

performance of his trial counsel.
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim we apply the two-part test of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
To satisfy that test, the defendant must show: "(1) that counsel's performance^was
deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2)
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,
P16, 26 P.3d 203, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 51. If a defendant fails to establish either of

In addition, Defendant plays semantics in arguing that the evidence supported "substantial" bodily
injury, but not "serious" bodily injury. At no point doe9j3efendant differentiate between the two, define either of
the two, or tell the Court why the injuries suffered by the victim are only "substantial" and not "serious."
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-7the two parts of the Strickland test, counsel's assistance was constitutionally
sufficient, and we need not address the other part of the test.
State v. Medina-Juarez. 2001 UT 79, 34 P.3d 187.
In the present case, Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel fails because he has not
shown that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance of his trial counsel.
Specifically, Defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome at trial had counsel performed differently. The only piece of "evidence" that Defendant has
submitted is the improper affidavit by one of the Jurors, discussed in Section I. Aside from the fact
that such affidavit in not admissible for purposes ,of proving a juror's thought-process, as discussed
in Section^ the affidavit in question does not insinuate that the result would have been any different
had the origin been known to the jury. Further, even if Mr. Dent had objected to, and successfully
kept out the letter which Defendant complains of, the jury still would have had the testimony of the
victim in this case, as well as Dr. Pearson, which, were overwhelmingly sufficient to convict
Defendant without the letter.
Defendant was not prejudiced by Mr. Dent's late service of a subpoena on Dr. Delcore. Had
Dr. Delcore been present at the trial, or a continued trail, he was adamant that his testimony would
be along the same lines of what was in the "letter." In fact, the Court notes that Dr. Delcore's
opinion, which was beneficial to the prosecution, was more forceful when stated verbally, and was
milder in the letter that was agreed to by the parties.
Defendant has submitted no other evidence regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of
Mr. Dent, and submits only bald assertions as to what may have been. Thereby, Defendant has failed
to show any prejudice suffered by the alleged ineffectiveness of Mr. Dent, and the Court need not
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-8examine the specific conduct of which Defendant complains to ascertain whether or not it falls below
the objective standard of reasonable performance by counsel.

ORDER
By reason of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for New Trial should be, and hereby is
denied.

DATED this

J2.
^

day of August, 2002.

ROBERT T. BRXITHWAITE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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